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Trends in Communist Propaganda 31 July 74

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TRENDS

In Communist Propaganda

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31 JULY 1974

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CYPRUS

USSR STATEMENT REITERATES COMMITMENT TO INDEPENDENT STATUS

Moscow on 28 July took several initiatives on Cyprus, initiatives apparently prompted by concern over the lack of progress in the tripartite Geneva negotiations to stabilize the situation on the island as well as a desire to promote a Soviet role in peace-making. A government statement was issued--the third since the 15 July ouster of Makarios--which pressed for implementation of the 20 July Security Council resolution, and the USSR requested an urgent council meeting to discuss this problem. The government statement warned that the "threat" to Cyprus' independence was "acquiring a new character," raising the "extremely acute question whether there will or will not remain an independent sovereign state." At the same time, in an unpublicized move, Moscow sent messages to London, Athens, Ankara, and the United Nations announcing its plan to send an observer to the Geneva negotiations.

Soviet media have thus far only briefly reported the 30 July cease-fire agreement in Geneva by the three guarantor powers--Britain, Turkey and Greece. A TASS report on the 31st merely said that a declaration had been signed on consolidation of the cease-fire agreement in compliance with Security Council Resolution 353 of 20 July, not indicating that the declaration in effect set another cease-fire as of 30 July after which areas controlled by opposing forces "should not be extended." TASS noted that the declaration "mentioned a number of measures" aimed at stabilizing the situation, and that the next stage of talks would open in Geneva on 8 August with representatives of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities "expected to take part."

An English-language Moscow broadcast to Britain noted that representatives of the three sides would be determining the cease-fire line and a buffer zone to be controlled by the United Nations Peacekeeping Force (UNFICYP) and that an exchange of captured military and civilian personnel would take place as soon as possible under Red Cross auspices. The broadcast cited British Foreign Secretary Callaghan as saying that the next stage would consider "constitutional problems, including restoration of the legitimate government."

SOVIET STAND ON
POLITICAL STATUS

The 28 July Soviet Government statement again stressed Moscow's long-standing commitment to Cyprus' independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity--a formula which dates back at least as far as a TASS statement in January 1964. The general themes of Soviet comment on

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on the Cyprus situation have varied little since then--calls for withdrawal of "all" foreign troops and persistent allegations of "NATO" designs to eliminate the island's independence.

The latest government statement for the first time during the current crisis hinted at concern over the possibility of eventual partition; it routinely made "certain NATO circles" the culprit, accusing them of "cynical haggling" over Cyprus' independence and territorial integrity to the extent of confronting the world with an accomplished fact of "a partition of the country or at least of conditions created for such a partition." A Zholkver foreign-language commentary on the 29th, pursuing this idea, accused "NATO quarters" of plans "to partition the island, or at least to produce conditions for partition." Reinforcing this insistence on Cyprus' independence, the government statement declared the inalienable right of the people of Cyprus, both Greeks and Turks, to decide their problems themselves, to decide the future of their "common motherland."

In keeping with past evasiveness regarding Turkey's role in the Cyprus problem, the statement approached Turkey's military action by indirection, complaining that "foreign armed forces which are in Cyprus are not being withdrawn but continue to be built up." Moscow would seem to have in mind Turkey's strengthening of its hold on the Kyrenia area and the Kyrenia-Nicosia corridor after the 22 July cease-fire when its statement referred cryptically to "consolidating the occupation of the island and tearing it asunder."

Soviet reportage has singled out Turkish officials' statements to portray Ankara as committed to an independent Cyprus and opposed to partition. Thus TASS on the 24th reported Prime Minister Ecevit as declaring that Turkey had no intention of occupying and annexing the island, but was concerned to restore the constitutional system. On the 26th, TASS noted that Foreign Minister Gunes in a LE MONDE interview "declared against the partitioning of Cyprus" and also "opposed a federal solution," saying "he did not yet have any concrete plan concerning a federal organization," and that Turkey wanted Cyprus to be a genuinely independent state separate from Greece and Turkey. Gunes in fact said that no one, except perhaps the Greeks, wanted to see Cyprus either annexed by Greece or Turkey or partitioned, but he declared that a federal system "is required," although "I have no precise plan in mind." In a dispatch from Ankara on the 29th, however,

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TASS reported Ecevit as declaring that after all that happened in the island, Turkish Cypriots could not live under Greek rule. He was quoted as adding that "until" the final status of the island was sorted out, "the Turkish and Greek administrations must be autonomous."

BACKGROUND: Moscow has long made clear its antipathy to enosis, or Cyprus' union with Greece, although it was not until April 1972, during a visit to Turkey, that Podgorny formally declared Soviet opposition to the concept--the first such statement at that authoritative level. The notion of Greek-Turkish partition of the island or "double enosis," Turkey's answer to Greek demands for enosis, has also been opposed by Moscow: Concern over "NATO plans" for partition of the island was expressed in a Soviet-Egyptian communique in September 1964.

The idea of a federal structure for the island has only occasionally been broached in Soviet comment, and is known to have been discussed only once at the elite level, by Gromyko in a January 1965 IZVESTIYA interview, and then in the framework of a single state. Last spring, when the inter-Cypriot talks were suspended over the issue of Turkey's espousal of a federal solution, Moscow expressed apprehension that federation might lead to partition of Cyprus. In his 1965 IZVESTIYA interview Gromyko remarked that the internal organization of the state was a matter for the Cypriots to decide, and observed that they might choose a federal structure, but that such a system presupposed the existence of a single central government, single defense organization, and centralized administrative and judicial system. In the same interview, Gromyko had stated the Soviet view that it was the "unconditional and inalienable right of the Cypriot people to decide their affairs themselves within their own independent state." As far back as August 1964 Khrushchev in a message to Makarios had, along similar lines, called for a solution of the Cyprus problem which would help the Greek and Turkish Cypriots to have an opportunity to work for peace for the good of their "common motherland."

Moscow's current re-emphasis on the need for the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Cyprus omits any mention of the need for a "unitary" state, which received short-lived currency in this formula at the time of Makarios' June 1971 visit to the Soviet Union. On the other hand, Moscow's formal statements during the current crisis have also refrained from leaning toward Ankara with references to "national communities" on the island. Communiques issued on visits of Turkish officials to Moscow in the

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past, such as Urguplu's September 1965 visit and Demirel's September 1967 trip, had taken into account Ankara's sensibilities in supporting the lawful rights and interests of the Turkish and Greek "national communities," in keeping with Turkish insistence that the Turkish Cypriots constitute a community rather than a "minority."

DEVELOPMENTS IN CYPRUS

Reportage on events in Cyprus has seemed at pains to obscure what was taking place. Thus, TASS dispatches on the 24th and 25th reported repeated violations of the 22 July cease-fire but did not identify the combatants, noting only that the violations occurred in Nicosia, Kyrenia, and the corridor "commanded by Turkish troops" between the two towns. TASS on the 25th cited a Turkish news agency report that a convoy of 20 Turkish vessels carrying troops and tanks had sailed for Cyprus. A dispatch the next day cited news agency reports that Turkish troops had "arrested" EOKA-B members who attacked Turkish Cypriot villages after the cease-fire agreement, and that a Greek detachment had opened fire on Turkish troops in Kyrenia. TASS the same day reported Kliridhis as saying at a press conference that hostilities could flare up if Turkish troops did not stop cease-fire violations, and it noted his remark that "territorial changes" resulting from the Turkish troop landing should not be permanent.

Not until the evening of the 27th did TASS indicate that Turkish troops had been seizing territory, when it reported from Beirut that Turkish troops "halted their advance" and that Turkish military contingents "somewhat expanded the area under their control." TASS on the 28th noted that Turkish troops controlled several major motor roads and had strengthened positions in central districts "in recent days," at the same time reporting that Greek units had established control over a number of Turkish settlements in the south of the island. The government statement repeated long-standing Soviet calls for an end to outside interference in Cyprus' affairs and the withdrawal of "all" foreign troops from the island. It specifically mentioned that the Greek military personnel responsible for the coup had not been removed, but carefully sidestepped any direct reference to Turkish troops.

A Beirut-dated dispatch by TASS on the 30th finally spelled out in more detail Turkish gains on the north coast, noting that Turkish troops controlled a section 20 kilometers in length. Troop strength was estimated at 25,000 to 30,000 men with more than 200 tanks, TASS said, and "they are able to expand areas under their control." The

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dispatch reported that the administrative bodies of the Turkish community were moved to Kyrenia, and that Ecevit said Turkey did not intend to withdraw its troops to a "definite line." On the other side of the coin, TASS noted Turkish Cypriot complaints that National Guard forces had shelled Turkish localities and forced about 20,000 people from their homes. The dispatch also cited news agency reports that UN patrols were "arrested" by Turkish troops en route to isolated districts to deliver food and medicine.

Moscow would seem to be keeping its options open with regard to the government in Cyprus: It continues to refer to Makarios as the legitimate president but has stopped short of demanding his reinstatement. Reportage has referred to Kliridhis as having assumed the presidency temporarily, and the current government statement charged that power was still in the hands of enosist "rebels." But a foreign-language commentary on the 29th seemed to suggest that Moscow's objection to Kliridhis stemmed from his retention of the ministers appointed to the short-lived Sampson government, and TASS the same day cited a statement by AKEL, the Cypriot communist party, calling Kliridhis' assumption of presidential duties a "reassuring" development "opening the way for a return to the constitutional system."

SOVIET ROLE Moscow gave little attention to the Geneva talks convened on the 25th, but Soviet discomfiture at being isolated from the negotiations and dissatisfaction over the slow progress of the talks seemed apparent in Moscow's request for a Security Council session to examine implementation of the council resolution and in its initiative to send a Soviet observer to Geneva. TASS reported the attendance of UN Under Secretary Guyer at the Geneva sessions, but did not mention that U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Buffum was present in Geneva during the negotiations. Moscow did not publicize its decision to send an observer to Geneva and, observing customary reticence on diplomatic contacts, Soviet media have not acknowledged the activity of the Soviet ambassador in Ankara. Turkish media reported that Ambassador Grubyakov met with Defense Minister and Acting Foreign Minister Isik on the 28th and 29th, and had contacts with "leading foreign ministry officials" on the 30th.

The Soviet initiative in calling a Security Council meeting also received minimal publicity. TASS on the 29th, reporting the session, explained that the basic provisions of the council's resolution had not been implemented: Cease-fire had not been observed, foreign military intervention was continuing, and the

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"legitimate government headed by Makarios" had not been reinstated. TASS reported the Soviet draft resolution as calling, among other things, for an end to "all acts of coercion" toward the republic of Cyprus and urging representation of "the constitutional government" of Cyprus in the Geneva negotiations. The government statement on the 28th had urged that the Cypriots be given the right to decide their future themselves, and had gone on to declare that "this presupposed" participation of the legitimate Cyprus Government in all international discussions of the Cyprus problem, including the Geneva talks.

The three government statements issued on the present crisis have refrained from connecting the Cyprus problem with Soviet security, as was done in the past: A Khrushchev speech in August 1964, for example, declared that the Soviet Union would not remain indifferent to the threat of an armed conflict close to the USSR's southern borders which might affect the security of the Soviet Union and its friends and allies. Some current press comment, however, such as PRAVDA's Greek and Cypriot specialist Bragin in an article on the 26th, has used a version of the long-standing "proximity" formula without mentioning the element of Soviet security. And scattered Soviet comment--again, Bragin is an example--has cited detente as a factor in helping contain the present crisis, but has gone on to complain of foot-dragging by some Western powers which hindered Security Council efforts to resolve the problem.

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USSR - EGYPT

IZVESTIYA VENTS SOVIET FRUSTRATION OVER EGYPT'S POLICIES

Moscow's growing displeasure with the course of Egypt's economic and foreign policies in recent months received prominent expression on 25 July in a major IZVESTIYA article by chief editor Lev Tolkunov. The most forthright and critical discussion of Soviet-Egyptian relations to appear in the Soviet press since the October 1973 war, the article analyzed positive and negative "trends" in the current Middle East situation, laying bare in the process Moscow's recurrent grievances with Cairo over issues of Soviet military aid, Egyptian economic liberalization, and Egypt's new "balancing act" between the USSR and the United States.

Tolkunov's article was almost certainly timed to reinforce the impact of its message. Appearing on the heels of Egypt's 22d revolution anniversary on 23 July, an event to which Moscow gave token attention, the article purported to be a trip report based on visits Tolkunov made "recently"--actually last March--to Lebanon, Syria, Egypt and Iraq. And it followed Soviet postponement of a projected July visit to Moscow by Soviet Foreign Minister Fahmi until "after October," according to as-Sadat. The significance Moscow attached to the article seemed further underscored by the manner in which it was publicized. On the 24th, TASS carried from that evening's edition of IZVESTIYA separate brief summaries of certain portions of Tolkunov's article, dealing with the Arab-Israeli issue, Egyptian economic and foreign policy, and anti-Soviet attacks by "Arab reaction." On the 25th, some hours after the article had appeared in IZVESTIYA's morning edition, TASS carried virtually the full text. Although TASS in the past has occasionally transmitted the text of major articles from the central press, it has normally done so in advance of or coincident with their publication. Versions of the Tolkunov article were also broadcast in Arabic and other languages on the 25th.

SOVIET ARMS Many of Tolkunov's sharp-edged comments were clearly intended to acknowledge and answer Egyptian President as-Sadat's public criticisms of Soviet military aid. Over the past several months as-Sadat has criticized, in particular, what he viewed as Moscow's failure to provide on a timely basis the number and types of weapons he thought necessary prior to the October 1973 war. He has also complained about the Soviet curtailment of military supplies to Egypt since the war and has announced his intention to "diversify" Egypt's source of arms, thus ending his country's dependence on the Soviet Union for weapons.

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Although Tolkunov did not mention as-Sadat by name, in listing and responding to accusations which "agents of imperialism and Arab reaction" have directed against Soviet policies, he cited points that as-Sadat has made in his speeches and that have been subsequently publicized by Egyptian and other Arab media. Thus, as-Sadat charged in a 3 April 1974 speech that Soviet arms destined for Egypt in late 1971 had been redirected to India for its conflict with Pakistan, thereby forcing an undesired postponement in Arab plans to renew military operations against Israel. Tolkunov dismissed as-Sadat's accusation--which he attributed to "some Egyptian journalists"--as "absolutely untenable," characterizing it as a form of "anti-Soviet propaganda."

The Tolkunov article also reflected Moscow's sensitivity to several other Egyptian criticisms of Soviet military aid. Tolkunov cited and attempted to rebut, for instance, accusations that Soviet weapons were of poor quality, "not capable of competing with U.S. weapons," supplied too late and in insufficient quantity, and delivered only in return for hard currency. He also asserted that the October war had refuted the criticism that the USSR supplied the Arabs only with weapons for defense and not offense, adding that the distinction is "entirely relative." Tolkunov denounced as discredited the contention--advanced by as-Sadat on several occasions--that Moscow would not permit the Arabs to fight Israel. Pursuing this point, Tolkunov stressed that Soviet policy had been consistent and principled, supplying weapons to Syria and Egypt despite "artificially created negative factors which appeared with regard to Soviet military experts in some Arab countries"--an obvious reference to as-Sadat's decision to expel the experts in mid-1972.

ECONOMIC TRENDS

In a brief assessment of Cairo's economic policy, Tolkunov reaffirmed a long-standing Soviet concern that Egypt might gradually lose its socialist orientation and thus abandon its economic ties with the USSR and other socialist countries. Professing to see the beginning of a shift of "anti-Soviet trends" within Egypt from the area of military affairs to economic matters, Tolkunov singled out as a special Soviet concern "all sorts of rumors" that large industrial projects constructed with Soviet aid were not profitable and could not compete with plants in the West, and that they represented an approach toward "economic giantism" which was not in Egypt's best interests. Tolkunov located the explanation for such thoughts in the desire of certain Egyptians to promote what he termed a "so-called liberation from Soviet dependence"--a theme popular with as-Sadat in recent months--and to expand economic relations with the West. Warning Cairo against "illusions" that the West would favor Egypt "if it departs further from cooperation with

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the Soviet Union," Tolkunov cautioned that increased economic collusion with Western capitalists could prove, as in the past, a bitter experience. Tolkunov concluded his remarks by posing what he designated as "questions which cannot be avoided" by the Egyptians, namely, what does Egypt stand to gain from the West; what motivates the West to seek economic cooperation with Egypt; and how effective and helpful to Egypt can cooperation with Western capitalists be.

U.S.-EGYPTIAN TIES Soviet concern over the evolving favorable political relationship between Egypt and the United States was also evident in Tolkunov's article. This concern expressed itself partly in reminders to Cairo that resumption of diplomatic relations with the United States last spring and its new relationship generally had had no effect on Israel's "aggressive" policies. By referring to U.S. weapons deliveries to Israel, Tolkunov gave his point a double edge, implying that it would also be naive to believe that U.S. policy toward the Arab states had changed, a position that as-Sadat has expressed on several occasions in recent months.

Reinforcing the impression of Soviet displeasure over new U.S.-Egyptian ties, Tolkunov indicated an accompanying uneasiness over the future of Soviet-Egyptian relations. He hinted that those Arab countries will not succeed who "are trying a balancing act to extract dividends from two poles"--almost certainly a reference to as-Sadat's announced new "balanced policy" between East and West. Tolkunov also claimed that Arabs he had met with, in debating the various points on which the USSR and Arab states either agree or differ, always concluded that the "decisive preponderance will undoubtedly be on the side of what unites us." Tolkunov observed that ideological and political differences emerged when one side decides it "does not want peaceful coexistence" and "pursues certain aims of its own." He warned that in such cases, the differences can be turned into "a real psychological war."

ARAB-ISRAELI ISSUE Tolkunov was also implicitly critical of as-Sadat's disengagement negotiations through Secretary Kissinger and seemed to suggest that the Egyptian president's desire to prepare carefully for the Geneva talks by holding a series of inter-Arab and other consultations was delaying resumption of the conference. At one point he stressed the need to activate the Geneva talks "without delay and, moreover, most actively and purposefully." (As-Sadat had asked rhetorically in a mid-July interview "how can the Soviets ask us to go quickly to the Geneva conference at a time when they are doing the reverse?") Tolkunov at another point represented "sober-minded"

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Arab personalities as having told him that Geneva should not be bypassed since it provided the Arabs a broad field of action through contacts and opportunities to receive support from many other states. Tolkunov argued that "bilateral contacts through someone else's mediation" restricted the framework of the Arab countries' political activity. He attached "special significance" to the fact that the Soviet Union in its actions concerning the Middle East was "constantly coordinating with its Arab friends"--an assertion Moscow made in claiming a tangible Soviet contribution to the Syrian-Israeli disengagement accord through Gromyko's visits to Damascus.

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EAST-WEST RELATIONS

MOSCOW HAILS GENEVA CSCE PROGRESS, REPEATS STAND ON MBFR

Soviet media have emphasized the positive in reporting the summer recess of the Geneva negotiations on the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), hailing partial agreements while playing down the fact that the talks recessed because of a lack of progress and to provide time for a reassessment of positions. At the same time, comment by Moscow and its East European allies on the Vienna force reductions negotiations, recessed from 17 July to 24 September, has continued to stress that their proposals of November 1973, unlike NATO's, are "realistic."

CSCE PROGRESS, SUMMER RECESS

TASS' description of the 26 July-2 September recess as "a short summer holiday" was typical of Moscow's effort to obscure the difficulties in Geneva while all but ignoring its longstanding call for a late-summer summit finale to the CSCE. Further evidence of Moscow's accent on the positive was its handling of the "package" agreement on the eve of the CSCE recess which, according to TASS, would outline the principles of cooperation in the humanitarian and cultural area based on "strict" observation of the "principles of sovereign equality of the states and noninterference." TASS quoted a signed article in PRAVDA on the 31st as saying that this agreement was a solution to "one of the most important issues facing the conference."

The comment has also repeatedly echoed Brezhnev's statement in his 21 July Warsaw speech in which he in effect sought to limit the Western goals for CSCE while calling on the conference to wind up with the accomplishments already reached. Brezhnev asserted that a solution to many of the issues raised by those in the West who want to "raise the stakes" at the conference could not be "achieved" because of the limited "level of trust" that has been reached between the states, adding that the solution to these problems "can be found later." Brezhnev also ridiculed the "deliberately contrived minor questions" raised in Geneva, labeling them "irrelevant trifles."

While citing public endorsements by West European leaders as well as Secretary Kissinger for a CSCE summit conference, possibly before the end of 1974, Moscow has denounced those in the West who now think the conference may not end until next year, if at all, thus hinting that a year-end CSCE summit also may be unattainable.

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VIENNA MBFR
NEGOTIATIONS

Moscow and East European spokesmen dealing with the Vienna force reduction talks broke no new ground in comments both before and after the last formal session on 17 July. The old charge that the NATO proposal seeks to secure unilateral military advantage over the Warsaw Pact was made again in a press conference on the 17th by Polish delegation head Strulak, speaking for the Soviet bloc. This charge was repeated in a rare discussion of MBFR in RED STAR on the 18th. The author, hardlining military theorist Colonel V. Larionov, charged bluntly that the NATO call for "asymmetrical" reductions would "give unilateral military advantages to the West and therefore it cannot be considered constructive." Strulak also reiterated long-standing charges that the West European direct participants in the talks do not want to make a commitment with the USSR, GDR, Poland, and with the United States to reduce their forces, and that NATO wants to ignore its air and nuclear forces in the negotiations.

That Moscow remains confident in its present negotiating stand and considers the ball is in the NATO court was revealed in an unusual pre-recess series of articles in three authoritative Soviet foreign affairs journals, which in effect put Moscow's position on record for public scrutiny and comparison with NATO's. The first and most authoritative was attributed to the head of the USSR delegation in Vienna, O. Khlestov, and contained the most exhaustive Soviet public elaboration to date of the Warsaw Pact's position; it appeared in the June issue of WORLD ECONOMICS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS. This was followed by an article in the July issue of USA by V. M. Komlev, who prior to this article was the main Moscow radio commentator on MBFR and had authored articles in PRAVDA on MBFR. The third was an article in the July issue of the monthly INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS by V. Viktorov, a frequent commentator on disarmament issues.

RECENT PRC COMMENT DEPICTS "DEADLOCK" IN EAST-WEST DETENTE

Recent Peking comment on U.S.-Soviet efforts to control the arms race and reach agreement on European issues has underlined China's increasing confidence that such detente efforts will achieve no major breakthrough inimical to China's international interests. Peking's current portrayal of detente as being in a stage of fundamental deadlock marks a departure from its more equivocal treatment last year, when it had generally predicted only the eventual failure of U.S.-Soviet reconciliation efforts.*

* For a discussion of earlier signs of Chinese satisfaction on this score, see TRENDS of 30 May 1974, pages 8-9.

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A 26 July NCNA report characterized recent U.S. Congressional passage of the annual arms procurement bill as a reflection of the "deadlock" in the SALT talks and the "accelerated pace" of the U.S.-Soviet arms race. Stressing the bill's provisions on research and development for a "new generation of strategic weapons" designed to foster a "new nuclear strategy" against the Soviet Union, Peking quoted U.S. spokesmen to the effect that such steps were needed because of recent major advances by Moscow in strategic arms and to "prevent the Soviet Union from gaining a distinct advantage." In a 21 December 1973 report marking Congressional approval of a similar defense spending bill last year, NCNA had not used such blunt language on the SALT talks and arms race, limiting itself to citing remarks by U.S. representatives that Washington might have to increase defense spending and nuclear arms development if the SALT negotiations failed to make significant progress.

A similar change has become evident in Peking's coverage of East-West talks over European security and the reduction of forces in Central Europe. While in the past Peking had focused on the conflicting interests of the Soviet Union and United States to predict eventual failure in the talks, recent Chinese coverage has described the negotiations as being in a virtual standstill. A 17 July NCNA article noted that recent force reduction meetings had become less frequent and of shorter duration because of East-West intransigence, and compared the conference to "a snail, crawling without end on the surface of a round table." A lengthy 27 July NCNA article ridiculed Brezhnev's assessment of the European security talks during his recent Warsaw speech by enunciating a long list of East-West wrangles over sensitive issues in the talks. NCNA hailed particularly Western determination to block repeated Soviet efforts to expedite proceedings in the current second stage of the conference toward the summit-level, third stage, stressing that the threat of Soviet military expansion has made the Western partners especially insistent that "practical results" be achieved before the summit meeting.

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INDOCHINA

DRV ECONOMIC MISSION CONCLUDES TALKS IN EAST EUROPE, USSR

A North Vietnamese delegation led by Politburo member and Vice Premier Le Thanh Nghi arrived in Moscow on 20 July after concluding official visits to Bulgaria, East Germany, and Hungary. Moscow, but not Hanoi, reported upon Nghi's arrival that he had come to attend the first meeting of the Soviet-Vietnamese intergovernmental committee for economic, scientific, and technical cooperation. The committee was created as part of the December 1972 USSR-DRV aid agreement, but had not heretofore met formally.* There have been no other reports on the DRV delegation's activities since its meeting with Premier Kosygin on the 23d and sessions of the Soviet-DRV committee from 22 to 24 July.

Joining in the Moscow discussions, along with Le Thanh Nghi, were Vice Chairman of the DRV State Planning Commission Le Khac, who had accompanied Nghi on his earlier stops in Eastern Europe, and two other officials who had not been previously reported as part of the delegation--Vice Minister of Foreign Trade Nguyen Van Dao and Vice Chairman of the State Commission for Science and Technology Le Khac. The Soviet side in the talks was led by V. N. Novikov, Deputy Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and member of the CPSU Central Committee, who has participated in previous economic aid negotiations with the Vietnamese.

VNA reports on the sessions of the USSR-DRV economic, scientific, and technical committee indicate that it examined questions concerning "assistance" and cooperation and discussed "Soviet aid to Vietnam in 1973." Available Soviet reports make no specific reference to assistance, stating that the committee reviewed questions of "cooperation" between the two nations in restoring and constructing projects important to the DRV national economy. Both Moscow and Hanoi note that the projects spanned the fields of power engineering, coal mining, building materials, and other areas, and that a permanent subcommittee for scientific and technical cooperation was set up.

* Similar bilateral committees had been established with several East European countries and had met before the USSR-DRV committee was set up. There were no reports of these committees meeting in conjunction with Le Thanh Nghi's visits to Eastern Europe this year, however.

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A 26 July VNA report on the visit also noted that on the 24th Le Thanh Nghi and Novikov signed "documents on the strengthening of economic, scientific, and technical cooperation between the two countries, and on Soviet aid to Vietnam." Moscow media are not known to have reported that any agreement was signed, although a Soviet broadcast in Vietnamese on the 24th noted that the committee had "discussed documents prepared by Soviet and Vietnamese specialists." The broadcast also said that the committee had examined various problems concerning cooperation between the two countries and had "fixed the dates for holding negotiations on future cooperation within the new five-year plan for 1976-1980." PRAVDA's 25 July report on the committee's activities merely said that "agreement was reached on cooperation between Soviet and DRV planning organs." Nghi's earlier talks in Eastern Europe appeared to have centered on cooperation in economic planning, and there were no reports that Nghi had concluded the usual annual agreements on aid to North Vietnam.

The last agreement on Soviet aid for the DRV was signed on 14 August 1973 and--according to Hanoi media accounts--covered assistance for the year 1974.* The agreement has been recalled in recent Moscow broadcasts in Vietnamese which also lauded the July 1973 visit to the USSR by DRV party First Secretary Le Duan and Premier Pham Van Dong and the communique at the conclusion of that visit which had called for intensified DRV-Soviet economic and technical cooperation.

TASS and PRAVDA carried only brief accounts of Le Thanh Nghi's meeting with Kosygin on 23 July, noting that it took place in an atmosphere of "friendship and cordiality" and that questions of the development of all-round cooperation were discussed. Hanoi's longer reports on the meeting suggested a warmer atmosphere of "militant solidarity and brotherly friendship." According to VNA, Kosygin "highly valued the Vietnamese people's successes and affirmed that the Soviet Union has been doing and will do everything in its power to support and assist Vietnam, 'one of the closest friends of the Soviet Union.'" Nghi was quoted by VNA as expressing thanks for the Soviet's "warm support and assistance to the Vietnamese people in the new stage of their revolution."

EAST EUROPE Before its arrival in Moscow the Le Thanh Nghi delegation had visited Bulgaria--from 9 to 13 July, East Germany--from 13 to 17 July, and Hungary--from 17 to 20 July.**

* The August 1973 agreement is discussed in the TRENDS of 15 August 1973, pages 3-4.

** The beginning of the East European tour is discussed in the TRENDS of 17 July 1973, pages 12-13.

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GRECHKO PLUGS BREZHNEV CULT, AFFIRMS ADEQUACY OF DEFENSE

A bow to Brezhnev's leadership and a strong affirmation of the adequacy of the country's defense posture were the main features of Defense Minister Grechko's speech to Soviet military academy graduates reported in RED STAR on 2 July. The evidence afforded by this speech does not support inferences drawn from some recent Grechko writings that Grechko may have become identified with forces in the leadership dedicated to bringing about fundamental changes in Soviet foreign and domestic policy, such forces presumably being aligned against Brezhnev.*

Grechko went out of his way in his military academy speech to identify himself as a Brezhnev loyalist. He did so by referring to Brezhnev as the head of the Politburo--a formula which, although it has lost some of its value as a political indicator through common usage, still serves as a symbol of personal deference and a badge of political loyalty. Grechko's use of the formula is particularly noteworthy, since his practice in this respect has varied. He was one of the first to use the formula, and he did it with embellishments, in a speech to the secretaries of army party organizations in March 1973--a period just preceding his elevation to the Politburo. Since joining the Politburo he has studiously avoided the practice, although he has included personal praise of Brezhnev in his speeches. His reiteration of the formula at this time thus takes on the significance of a singular gesture.

The other main feature of Grechko's speech sheds little light on the question of his relationship with Brezhnev, but it does suggest that he has few quarrels with the regime on questions of defense policy. With all due allowances for the nature of the occasion, Grechko's expressions of confidence in the state of the country's defenses seemed to go beyond the requirements of strict propriety. He asserted that the armed forces have "everything necessary," and that they are "now equipped with the most modern weapons and combat equipment." His only

* See "New Grechko Article Reflects Recent Shifts in Official Outlook," in the TRENDS of 30 May, 1974, page 30.

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references to the need for further development concerned matters of training and personnel skills. He made no references to imperialist threats or to the danger of war.

In these respects, his speech recalls his major article in QUESTIONS OF CPSU HISTORY, No. 5, 1974, which provided some of the evidence for the inferences about a leadership realignment mentioned above. Although, being a longer and more comprehensive statement, the article had room for a variety of themes, its dominating theme was one of self-confidence both in the trend of world developments and in the ability of the armed forces to meet the responsibilities which these developments might impose. While its full significance will no doubt be clarified by future doctrinal writings and authoritative statements, it stands at this point as the major Soviet effort to date to restate a rationale for the armed forces in a period of detente.

CPSU PLENUM APPROVES GOVERNMENT, IGNORES SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES

The brief official announcement on the 24 July CPSU Central Committee plenum--the first since December 1973--indicates that its purpose was merely to approve the new government and that no substantive issues were discussed. The three-sentence announcement stated cryptically that Brezhnev had spoken on an unspecified subject and that the plenum had considered questions facing the Supreme Soviet, which met the next day to reappoint the government ministers. On the two previous occasions in the Brezhnev era when plenums were held to approve a new government (on 1 August 1966 and 13 July 1970), they had been preceded by plenums devoted to substantive issues.

The failure to hold a substantive plenum in more than seven months* suggests a continuing Soviet leadership stalemate over economic policy, a subject which has been recently discussed by various Politburo members in their pre-election speeches.

* There have been two exact precedents for the seven and a half month interval between the last two plenums: from 26-27 April 1973 to 10-11 December 1973; and from 9 April 1971 to 22 November 1971.

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The newly elected Supreme Soviet, meeting on 25 and 26 July, reappointed the Council of Ministers intact, with the addition of RSFSR First Deputy Premier A.M. Shkolnikov as head of the USSR People's Control Committee. This post had been vacant since G.I. Voronov was removed as chairman following his expulsion from the Politburo at the 27 April 1973 Central Committee plenum. Voronov had been removed as RSFSR premier and demoted to this powerless post in mid-1971 as a result of a long conflict with Brezhnev and Polyanskiy. Shkolnikov himself, long a close ally of Voronov, was appointed RSFSR first deputy premier in November 1965, while Voronov was RSFSR premier. No replacement for Shkolnikov in his RSFSR post has yet been announced.

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NOTES

JAROSZEWICZ VISIT TO ROMANIA: The communique on Polish Premier Jaroszewicz's 25-26 July visit to Romania, reported by AGERPRES on the 27th, assessed economic relations between the two countries as favorable while calling for "considerably expanding" trade and other economic cooperation. Although no formal economic agreements were signed, the communique stated that Jaroszewicz and Premier Manescu "had agreed on measures, ways and means" to expand and diversify economic and scientific-technical cooperation. Romania's distaste for even the phrase "socialist economic integration" was underlined by its absence from the speeches of Manescu and President Ceausescu, whereas Jaroszewicz, during a dinner speech on the 25th reported by PAP that day, emphasized that Poland in its relations with other countries attaches "the greatest weight" to the CEMA program of socialist economic integration. The communique made a pro forma bow to the CEMA program by noting that the development of economic relations between the two countries would contribute to realizing the "complex program of further deepening and improving economic relations and developing socialist economic integration" of the CEMA countries.

PURGED PRC MILITARY LEADER APPEARS: Yang Cheng-wu, former PLA acting chief of staff who was purged in March 1968, reappeared at the annual Chinese Army Day reception in Peking on 31 July. Yang was accorded no title by the 31 July NCNA account of the reception, but headed a list of once-purged military leaders said to be "also present at the reception." Former air force commander Yu Li-chun, purged with Yang in 1968, also appeared at the reception. A third military leader purged at the time, Peking garrison commander Fu Chung-pi, did not appear. The reception turnout was headed by Chou En-lai, marking his first such appearance since his recent hospital stay. Almost all other Politburo members usually in Peking, including Wang Hung-wen, Yeh Chien-ying and Chiang Ching, turned out for the occasion. No speech was given, but Yeh Chien-ying offered a toast noting that the movement to criticize Lin Piao and Confucius "is developing in depth."

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SUPPLEMENTARY ARTICLE

CAMBODIAN FRONT POLICY SHIFTS ON A PEACE SETTLEMENT

Recent evidence suggests that in the past few months the Cambodian Front forces opposing the Phnom Penh government have united on a more flexible position regarding a settlement that implies willingness to consider a nonmilitary solution. The current position appears to be the most moderate Front stance on a settlement since a brief period of flexibility at the time of the January 1973 Paris agreement on Vietnam and represents a return to an ostensibly more reasonable posture after long periods of intransigence and strong anti-U.S. hostility in which the emphasis had been strongly on a military solution. The Front leaders--Sihanouk and his entourage in Peking, and the ministers in Cambodia's interior headed by Defense Minister Khieu Samphan--continue to espouse Sihanouk's 23 March 1970 five-point program advocating resistance to the United States and Cambodian President Lon Nol and the formation of a government under Sihanouk, and Sihanouk in early July denounced the latest peace initiative from Lon Nol. However, a review of Front statements over the past year and a half reveals that the current Front stance represents a considerable departure from hardline positions emphasizing a military solution which were previously espoused by the insurgent leaders in Cambodia and endorsed, sometimes with seeming reluctance, by Sihanouk.

EARLY 1973 After the January 1973 signing of the Paris peace agreement there was a significant softening of the Cambodian Front's public stance on political settlement. Up to that time Front spokesmen had harshly and repeatedly castigated U.S.-sponsored efforts to reach a compromise agreement in Cambodia and had stressed that peace would be achieved after a military solution involving the expulsion of the United States, the destruction of the Lon Nol regime, and the seizure of power by Prince Sihanouk and the Front. Following the signing of the Vietnam peace accord, however, Sihanouk disclosed in interviews with Western newsmen during a sojourn in Hanoi that the Vietnam cease-fire had prompted a reassessment of Front positions. Sihanouk emphasized that the Front was now ready to engage in unconditional talks with the United States on the Cambodian problem and, though he ruled out peace talks with the Lon Nol government, he promised a decrease in military action and provision for a general amnesty in Cambodia. He said that the new Front approach had the complete support of Peking and Hanoi, but indicated that Khieu Samphan and the other insurgents in Cambodia had yet to give their complete approval.

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At the same time Khieu Samphan and the ministers in Cambodia demonstrated their intransigence, reaffirming their unwillingness to consider a negotiated solution. In a series of authoritative pronouncements during May, which seemed to have been prompted by the U.S.-DRV talks, the leaders warned shrilly against U.S. moves to foster a settlement and promised a military solution to the Cambodian problem. Typically, Khieu Samphan on 10 May charged that the "sham peace, ceasefire, and national concord maneuvers" of the United States and Lon Nol were designed to cover their weakness while they continued "sucking the blood of our people." Calling for even more intense attacks during the ongoing rainy season offensive, the defense minister pledged continued armed struggle until the United States was driven out and the Phnom Penh regime overturned.

In the wake of the May U.S.-DRV talks, Front statements muffled warnings against "sham peace maneuvers" and, anticipating the impending 15 August halt to U.S. bombing, pressed optimistic predictions of an early military liberation of Phnom Penh. Thus, an RGNU statement signed by the three chief ministers in Cambodia on 21 July, marking the conclusion of the landmark RGNU national congress session, confidently predicted that "nothing can remedy" the "disastrous situation" of the Phnom Penh regime and promised to intensify struggle in all forms until the Front's maximum demands were achieved. Sihanouk too reflected more confidence over the likelihood of military victory, though he continued to focus on U.S. disengagement as the crucial element in resorting Cambodian peace.

When Phnom Penh and other government strongholds did not fall under insurgent attacks in August and early September, Front media assumed a low posture, halting the heavy flow of authoritative statements that had characterized their propaganda since the beginning of the year. At the same time Sihanouk assumed a more moderate tone: His 29 September National Day message to PRC leaders, for example, promised a struggle to achieve the five points, but did not criticize the Phnom Penh leaders by name or repeat the rhetoric of his message on the same occasion a year earlier, one that had emphasized Front resolve to carry out a "war of resistance" "without retreat or compromise whatever may be the sacrifices and duration of the war."

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1973-74 DRY SEASON The start of the dry season in Cambodia brought a resumption of authoritative insurgent statements in late October 1973 predicting military victory and condemning compromise. Khieu Samphan set the tone with optimistic assertions that the struggle had reached "a decisive and irreversible phase that will unavoidably lead soon to total victory." He promised that the insurgents would launch wide-ranging offensives to drive out the United States and destroy the Lon Nol regime, and he derided alleged maneuvers by the Nixon Administration to find "a way out." Sihanouk seemed to again be reluctant to echo this militant posture, but finally endorsed Khieu Samphan's line in a 22 November statement pegged to the UN General Assembly debate on Cambodia.

The failure of the dry season offensive to dislodge the Phnom Penh regime was reflected in the moderation of Front military comment by early January 1974. Consistent with this trend, authoritative comment on the Front anniversary in March 1974 reflected a somber evaluation of the Front position. Sihanouk, speaking in Canton on 23 March, endeavored to explain the insurgents' failure to overthrow Lon Nol during the dry season campaign by pointing out that the Front was struggling against not only Lon Nol but also the United States--"the biggest imperialism in the world." He warned that there may be "protracted" struggle that "will continue for several more years."

The tempering of Front military predictions may have been influenced by the attitude of its foreign allies as well as the battlefield situation. Peking and Hanoi both had reduced their public support for the Front in the wake of the Paris peace agreement, and by March 1974 their restrained attitude was particularly evident. For the first time, the usual PRC leaders' message on the occasion was not carried by NCNA, but was monitored only in Peking radio broadcasts beamed to Indochina. The message mentioned the insurgents' striving for achievement of the five points but avoided any direct PRC endorsement of the Front settlement position. Similarly, the DRV leaders' message and remarks by DRV spokesmen at the RGNU Ambassador's reception in Hanoi were much less effusive than in the previous year.

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CURRENT PERIOD

Against the backdrop of reduced military prospects for the insurgents in the near term, Sihanouk has continued to stress that an end to U.S. interference would solve the Cambodian problem and, during a visit to Laos in March, he revived his offer to negotiate with Washington. More importantly, Khieu Samphan statements, during a three-month tour abroad beginning at the end of March, have reflected the first significant moderation of the interior ministers' position on a settlement since the time of the Paris peace agreement in January 1973.

Khieu Samphan's speeches during his tour implicitly recognized the failure of his previous calls for an all-out dry season offensive, echoing prevailing Front comment which blamed the continued military standoff on increased U.S. aid to Lon Nol. He was at pains to show the reasonableness of the Front position on a settlement and its sincere desire for peace. He soft-pedaled past concern with the military liberation of Cambodia, emphasizing instead the contention, long voiced by Sihanouk, that the United States was the key to peace. He repeatedly asserted that U.S. disengagement was the "only way" the Cambodian problem would be solved and explained that the Front was constrained to continue fighting since the United States continued its involvement in Cambodia. Though he did not endorse Sihanouk's call for negotiations with the United States, the defense minister did not repeat previous harsh criticism of U.S. peace moves and avoided directly ruling out talks with Washington.

Subsequent Front comment has followed the new direction reflected in Khieu Samphan's statements. Most recently, Sihanouk's 10 July statement, rejecting Lon Nol's call the previous day for unconditional peace talks, affirmed that "the key to war and peace in Cambodia is in the hands of the United States." Persistently refusing talks with Lon Nol, he stressed that an end to U.S. interference would restore peace. He added that there was no need for negotiations or an international conference on Cambodia, but refrained from directly spurning talks with the United States. Sihanouk saw little likelihood of an expeditious military liberation of the country in the absence of U.S. disengagement, indicating that heavy U.S. aid might necessitate a prolonged armed struggle. There has been no comment from the interior ministers on the Lon Nol proposal.

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There is no indication that the Cambodian Front leaders have abandoned any of their basic aims; however, their current public position suggests a willingness to consider a nonmilitary solution and greater flexibility in achieving it:

+ Front media reflect a more somber assessment of the military balance in Cambodia, demonstrating a judgment that military victory over Phnom Penh may be achieved only after protracted struggle. There has been a corresponding decline in authoritative comment calling for all-out military offensive as the proper means to achieve the total liberation of Cambodia.

+ While reducing attention to a military solution, comment has emphasized the insurgents' sincere desire for peace. U.S. disengagement is presented as the key to peace.

+ In focusing on the U.S. role, comment has markedly reduced attention to the two former Front preconditions for peace: that the Lon Nol regime be destroyed and that the Front be installed in power over all of Cambodia.

+ Comment has consistently ruled out talks with Phnom Penh, but has not stressed concern over U.S. moves to achieve a peaceful settlement. It has carefully refrained from closing the door on direct talks with the United States.

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A P P E N D I X

MOSCOW, PEKING BROADCAST STATISTICS 22 - 28 JULY 1974

<u>Moscow (2482 items)</u>			<u>Peking (921 items)</u>		
Polish Liberation 30th Anniversary	(16%)	13%	Law of the Sea Conference	(10%)	20%
[Brezhnev Speeches in Poland]	(5%)	5%	Criticism of Lin Piao and Confucius	(9%)	9%
Supreme Soviet Presidium Session	(--)	11%	Cyprus Crisis	(3%)	5%
Cyprus Crisis	(17%)	9%	Niger Delegation in PRC	(12%)	5%
[Soviet Government Statement 28 July]	(--)	2%	Indochina	(2%)	3%
Cuba 26 July Anniversary	(--)	6%	Death of Romanian Leader Constantinescu	(--)	3%
China	(5%)	5%			

These statistics are based on the voicecast commentary output of the Moscow and Peking domestic and international radio services. The term "commentary" is used to denote the lengthy item—radio talk, speech, press article or editorial, government or party statement, or diplomatic note. Items of extensive reportage are counted as commentaries.

Figures in parentheses indicate volume of comment during the preceding week.

Topics and events given major attention in terms of volume are not always discussed in the body of the Trends. Some may have been covered in prior issues; in other cases the propaganda content may be routine or of minor significance.